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LLB (Hons) (National University of Singapore), BCL, DPhil (Oxford); 
Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore); 
Yong Pung How Professor of Law, School of Law,  
Singapore Management University. 
Introduction 
20.1 There was no single ruling or decision of signal importance to 
the law of restitution in 2008. Instead, there were a number of decisions 
which tested the boundaries of various aspects of the law, sometimes 
only incidentally. 
20.2 At the outset, P T Panasonic Gobel Indonesia v Stratech Systems 
Ltd [2009] 1 SLR 470 (Judith Prakash J) provides a timely reminder that 
failing to plead restitutionary relief and merely addressing the court on 
the issue only in closing submissions could prove fatal to the 
restitutionary claim, as such a course of action prejudices the defendant 
in not conducting its case to meet the claim (at [87]). The law of 
restitution does not reflect a general appeal to the sense of justice of the 
court; it is a developing body of law that is co-extensive with the law of 
contract and torts. 
Duress 
20.3 In Tam Tak Chuen v Khairul Bin Abdul Rahman [2008] 
SGHC 242 (Judith Prakash J), a number of interesting legal propositions 
were discussed by the court in the course of dealing with arguments to 
set aside a contract on the basis that it had been procured by economic 
duress. The decision is relevant to the law of restitution in two ways. 
First, in cases where benefits have been conferred under a contract, the 
contract needs to be set aside before the restitution of the benefits on 
the ground of duress can be successful. Secondly, if the duress exerted 
resulted in the transfer of benefits in a transaction that is short of a 
contract, the same principles of economic duress are relevant to 
determine whether there is legal ground for restitutionary recovery. An 
example of economic duress giving rise to both contractual and non-
contractual transactions is Dimskal Shipping Co SA v International 
Transport Workers Federation [1992] 2 AC 152. 
20.4 In the present case, the plaintiff and the first defendant were 
partners in a medical practice. The first defendant, having procured 
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video evidence that the plaintiff had been carrying on an affair with a 
clinical assistant, persuaded the plaintiff to sell his share in the practice 
to the first defendant for $50,000. The first defendant had suggested that 
the video files would be tendered as evidence for winding up the 
partnership otherwise (thus rendering the affair public). After the 
plaintiff discovered that his wife had already been informed by the first 
defendant of the affair, he successfully applied to the High Court to set 
aside the agreement for economic duress. Three points are of interest to 
this review. 
20.5 The first point of interest relates to the role of “manifest 
disadvantage”, a concept more commonly associated with the doctrine 
of undue influence, in economic duress. In the context of undue influence, 
it has been made clear manifest disadvantage has no role to play in 
actual undue influence (CIBC Mortgages Plc v Pitt [1994] 1 AC 200) and 
at best plays an evidential role in presumed undue influence in 
indicating that there is something in the transaction that calls for an 
explanation: Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No 2) [2002] 
2 AC 773. Economic duress is closely analogous to actual undue 
influence (Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No 2) [2002] 2 AC 773 
at [8]), and it would have been expected that economic duress will have 
little or nothing to do with the concept of “manifest disadvantage” at all. 
20.6 It is, therefore, surprising to see in the instant case an argument 
by defendant’s counsel that the plaintiff ’s claim in economic duress 
should fail at the threshold because of the absence of manifest 
disadvantage: Tam Tak Chuen v Khairul Bin Abdul Rahman [2008] 
SGHC 242 at [23]. The argument was rejected by the court on the basis 
that there was manifest undervalue to the plaintiff in the transaction. 
The only support for the legal proposition advanced was a passage from 
N Enonchong, Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionable Dealing 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2006) at p 34 (quoted in Tam Tak Chuen v 
Khairul Bin Abdul Rahman [2008] SGHC 242 at [22]), which, when read 
in context, indicated that the author was merely using the concept as an 
illustration of what could turn a threat of lawful action into illegitimate 
pressure. A close reading of the judgment indicates that the court did 
not actually accept the argument as a matter of law; there was simply no 
factual foundation for the legal argument to succeed in the first place. 
20.7 The second point of interest is the test of causation applied by 
the court. The court accepted Barton v Armstrong [1976] AC 104 
(PC, New South Wales), a case on duress to the person, as authoritative 
for economic duress as well: Tam Tak Chuen v Khairul Bin Abdul 
Rahman, at [62]. Thus, it was “up to the defendant to prove that the 
pressure had contributed nothing to the plaintiff ’s decision” to enter 
into the transaction: Tam Tak Chuen v Khairul Bin Abdul Rahman, 
at [62]. Two points follow from this. The first is that after the plaintiff 
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has established the illegitimacy of the pressure, the burden shifts to the 
defendant to prove that it did not cause the plaintiff to enter into the 
transaction. Secondly, the test for causation is based on the analogy of 
misrepresentation; the duress need only be “a reason” rather than the 
“but for” reason. This differs from what appears to be the current 
thinking in the English common law that, for economic duress, the 
burden remains on the plaintiff and the burden is to show not only that 
the plaintiff would not have entered into the transaction but for the 
duress, but also that the duress was a significant reason for the plaintiff ’s 
decision: Huyton SA v Peter Cremer GmbH & Co [1999] 
1 Lloyd’s Rep 620 (QBD). In that case, Mance J (now Lord Mance) 
thought that, in duress to the person, the burden justifiably shifted 
because in such cases there is usually little doubt that the threats were 
made in bad faith and operated to achieve their intended effect; in 
contrast, the range of circumstances that could amount to economic 
duress is much wider. Underlying the judgment is a concern for 
certainty in commercial transactions. Mance J also relied on Dimskal 
Shipping Co SA v International Transport Workers Federation [1992] 
2 AC 152 for the proposition that the duress had to be a significant 
cause. 
20.8 In the present case, it is by no means clear that a different 
conclusion would have been reached if the Singapore court had 
followed the English approach. The indications go the other way; there 
was no evidence of any other reason why the plaintiff would sell his 
share of the partnership at all. The English cases were not cited in the 
present case, and the test of causation did not appear to have been 
contested. In the circumstances, it would be too much to read this case 
as settling the point. The arguments on the correct test under Singapore 
law must await another case. 
20.9 The third point of interest is the court’s acknowledgment that it 
has the judicial discretion to award damages in lieu of rescission of the 
contract for economic duress. The question whether damages are 
available for economic duress is a contentious and unsettled point in 
English law, where there has been no authoritative judicial decision 
either way. There are occasional references to the “tort” of economic 
duress (eg, Huyton SA v Peter Cremer GmbH & Co [1999] 
1 Lloyd’s Rep 620 (QBD) at 638; Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil 
(Great Britain) Ltd [1985] 1 WLR 173 (CA) at 177), but they could be 
referring to situations where the same facts also amount to the 
recognised tort of unlawfully causing economic harm. The strongest 
statement that economic duress is actionable as a tort is that of 
Lord Scarman in Universe Tankships Inc of Monrovia v International 
Transport Workers Federation [1983] 1 AC 366 at 400, but that needs to 
be contrasted with Lord Diplock’s explicit denial of that proposition 
(at 385). 
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20.10 This point was, as in the case of the other two points above, not 
the subject of considered argument, and the court ultimately decided 
that it would order rescission anyway as no reasons had been given why 
an award of damages was the more appropriate relief: Tam Tak Chuen v 
Khairul Bin Abdul Rahman [2008] SGHC 242 at [79]. There is thus 
support by way of the court’s observation (only) that damages are 
available as an alternative to rescission, but it is not clear what the basis 
of the claim for damages was. If indeed it were based on tort, then it is 
not a matter of judicial discretion; tort damages are a matter of right. It 
is up to the plaintiff whether he wants to claim damages or not and, 
absent bad faith (Rickshaw Investments Ltd v Nicolai Baron von Uexkull 
[2007] 1 SLR 377 (CA) at [47]), no amount of good reason by the 
defendant can confine the plaintiff to his tort claim in substitution for 
his contractual one. It is also hard to see it as equitable compensation as 
the relief sought was not equitable; economic duress is a common law 
doctrine. Even if it is equitable rescission that is invoked in equity’s 
auxiliary jurisdiction to come to the aid of the common law in 
unwinding the transaction, it is not clear that there is judicial discretion 
to award damages in the alternative; it is to be noted that the damages in 
lieu of rescission for misrepresentation is a statutory remedy 
(Misrepresentation Act (Cap 390, 1994 Rev Ed), s 2(2)); as in the case of 
damages in lieu of specific performance or injunction (Supreme Court 
of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed), s 18(2), First Sched, para 14). 
Historically, there was no question of equitable compensation for a 
common law wrong. Although the court is entitled to expand the scope 
of equitable jurisdiction to award equitable compensation, much in the 
same way that the court has expanded the equitable jurisdiction to grant 
account of profits for a statutory wrong in Ng Bok Eng Holdings Pte Ltd v 
Wong Ser Wan [2005] 4 SLR 561 (CA) (noted in (2005) 6 SAL Ann Rev 443 
at 447–451, paras 19.11–19.21), this needs to be a measured and 
incremental development; this point was not the subject of argument in 
the case. Another possible offshoot of this development is the argument 
that the “damages” is really a form of pecuniary restitution to restore the 
unjust gains obtained by the defendant at the plaintiff ’s expense (see, in 
the context of undue influence, P Birks “Unjust Factors and Wrongs” 
[1997] RLR 76), which may be a useful remedy particularly in cases 
where the right to rescind has been lost (eg, by the intervention of third 
party rights). 
Payment under mistake of law 
20.11 After the leading decision of the Court of Appeal of Singapore 
in Management Corp Strata Title No 473 v De Beers Jewellery Pte Ltd 
[2002] 2 SLR 1 (discussed in (2002) 3 SAL Ann Rev 345 at 345–360, 
paras 19.2–19.47), it is clear that a payment made under a mistake of law 
is recoverable in principle. That case itself focussed on the basis of 
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recovery and recognised a number of defences, including settlement of 
an honest claim, compromise, change of position, payment under a 
settled view of the law, and possibly the passing on of the burden of 
payment in non-private law claims. The scope of this cause of action 
was briefly considered in two High Court cases. 
Causative mistake 
20.12 In Mok Kwong Yue v Ding Leng Kong [2008] SGHC 65 (Judith 
Prakash J), the claim failed because the plaintiff had failed to show that 
he would not have made the payment but for the mistake of law, and 
that in any event there was no mistake of law. The plaintiff had arranged 
for loans to be made by the defendant to companies controlled by the 
plaintiff. When the companies could not make timely repayments, the 
plaintiff paid the defendant certain sums of money. The defendant 
eventually obtained judgment against the companies as borrowers and 
the plaintiff as guarantor. The plaintiff claimed that this judgment 
established that he was not liable as a guarantor under that arrangement 
except for a particular sum in respect of which he had admitted liability 
as surety, and argued for the return of the difference between the sum 
paid to the defendant and the sum he was held to be owing under the 
judgment, as money paid under a mistake of law. The court found that 
the payments were made by the plaintiff in order to forestall any action 
by the defendant to enforce the loan agreement that could jeopardise the 
business projects of the borrowers. Thus, the mistake was not operative 
in the plaintiff ’s mind when the payments were made. The court further 
held that the previous judgment pronounced on the plaintiff ’s liability 
as guarantor because he was sued in the capacity of a guarantor only, 
and that on the proper interpretation of the transaction (which was not 
inconsistent with the findings of the previous court), the plaintiff was in 
truth liable as a principal for the loans. Thus, the plaintiff ’s claim also 
failed because there was no mistake of law even if the plaintiff had paid 
in the belief that he was personally liable on the loans. 
Mistake and doubts 
20.13 In Tsu Soo Sin v Ng Yee Hoon [2008] SGHC 30 (Lai Siu Chiu J), 
the claim failed because no mistake was proven. The plaintiff, the 
administratrix of her husband’s estate, claimed to recover as a mistaken 
payment a sum of $666,666 paid to the defendant, one of four sisters of 
the plaintiff ’s late husband. The plaintiff ’s father-in-law, in patriarchical 
tradition, had bequeathed all his assets only to his (three) sons. The 
plaintiff alleged that she had written a cheque for the defendant at a 
family meeting after being informed about an agreement made between 
the beneficiaries (while her late husband was still alive) of her father-in-
law’s will that they (the three male beneficiaries) would contribute $2m 
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for distribution among the sisters. The plaintiff alleged that the payment 
was induced by mistake as well as by duress. 
20.14 The court dismissed the plaintiff ’s claim, finding that there was 
indeed a legally enforceable agreement, and that the plaintiff had paid 
neither under a mistake nor under duress. In dealing with the mistaken 
payment claim, the court held that the only possible mistake that the 
plaintiff could have made was as to the existence or enforceability of the 
agreement, and that was not a mistake in view of the court’s finding. 
The court affirmed the causal test for mistaken payments: a party may 
recover a payment if in making that payment he operated under a 
mistake and that he would not have made the payment but for the 
mistake: Tsu Soo Sin v Ng Yee Hoon [2008] SGHC 30 at [79]. The court 
also observed that a payment will not be recoverable if made under 
ignorance, misprediction, omission or doubt, or if the payment was 
made pursuant to a compromise to settle an honest claim: Tsu Soo Sin v 
Ng Yee Hoon [2008] SGHC 30 at [81]. This summary belies the 
complexity of the law. For example, the existence of doubt is not 
necessarily inconsistent with the making of an operative mistake; in 
every case it is a question whether the payer took the risk that he might 
be wrong, and this requires an assessment of the facts and circumstances 
of the case: Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Group Plc v IRC [2007] 1 AC 558 
at [26] and [65]. Further, there is a spectrum of state of minds between 
sheer ignorance to positive but incorrect belief (David Securities Pty Ltd 
v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 175 CLR 353 at 374; Deutsche 
Morgan Grenfell Group Plc v IRC [2007] 1 AC 558 at [65]), and it was 
pointed out by the court in Mok Kwong Yue v Ding Leng Kong [2008] 
SGHC 65 at [23] that even sheer ignorance of the law could be a basis 
for a restitutionary claim for a mistaken payment; in every case the 
question is whether the payer had assumed the risk of the mistake. 
20.15 Consistently with these principles, the court in Tsu Soo Sin v Ng 
Yee Hoon [2008] SGHC 30 observed that on the facts the plaintiff ’s 
claim for recovery of a mistaken payment could not succeed if she had 
paid in spite of doubts whether her husband had in fact entered into an 
agreement to share the legacy, or if the plaintiff had paid taking the risk 
that there may not have been any such agreement: at [82]. It may be 
thought that it was unnecessary even to consider the question of 
mistake, since the finding of a legally enforceable contract meant that 
there was a legal entitlement to be paid anyway: see Deutsche Morgan 
Grenfell Group Plc v IRC [2007] 1 AC 558 at [65]. (The defendant had 
apparently collected the sum on behalf of her sisters as well: see Tsu Soo 
Sin v Ng Yee Hoon [2008] SGHC 30 at [8] and [9].) 
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Mistake and contracts 
20.16 A third case considered mistake of law in the context of a claim 
to rescind a contract. Although this is strictly not restitutionary claim, it 
could have consequences for the law of restitution because it is 
necessary to rescind any valid contract between the parties before 
making a restitutionary claim based on a mistaken payment (see, 
eg, Info-communications Development Authority of Singapore v Singapore 
Telecommunications Ltd (No 2) [2002] 3 SLR 488), noted in (2002) 
3 SAL Ann Rev 345 at 360–367, paras 19.48–19.66). In Ng Guat Hua v 
Onestoneinvest Ptd Ltd [2008] SGHC 156 (Lai Siu Chiu J), a claim to 
rescind a contract of compromise for mistake of law and fact was 
denied, primarily on the basis that the alleged mistake was only 
unilateral and unknown to the other party: Ng Guat Hua, at [36]. 
However, the court stated as a general rule that money paid under a 
mistake as to the general law or as to the legal effect of the circumstances 
under which it is paid, but with full knowledge of the facts, was 
irrecoverable: Ng Guat Hua v Onestoneinvest Pte Ltd, at [34]. The 
authority cited for this proposition was Chitty on Contract vol 1 
(29th Ed, 2004) at p 1656, para 29-040. This proposition – which in the 
context must be confined to the issue of the validity of the contract – 
must now be doubted in English law because of Brennan v Bolt Burden 
[2005] 1 QB 303, which extended the restitutionary ruling in Kleinwort 
Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349 to mistakes in 
contract law. The primary ruling in the latter case (the removal of the 
mistake of law bar to restitutionary recovery) has been accepted in 
Singapore law (Management Corp Strata Title No 473 v 
De Beers Jewellery Pte Ltd [2002] 2 SLR 1 (CA)), but it has yet to be 
extended to the law of contract in Singapore. The observation was not 
crucial to the decision in Ng Guat Hua v Onestoneinvest Pte Ltd [2008] 
SGHC 156, where no operative mistake could be shown anyway, and 
where the plaintiff ’s claim had also failed on procedural grounds: 
at [36]. The question thus remains an open one under Singapore law. 
Knowing receipt: Standard of liability 
20.17 The issue of the standard of liability when the defendant is 
sought to be made personally liable for the receipt of misappropriated 
trust property (see (2006) 7 SAL Ann Rev 397 at 398–400,  
paras 20.4–20.10) continues to vex the court. In an observation of the 
court (since it was found that there was no factual foundation for the 
argument to succeed) in Sukhpreet Kaur Bajaj d/o Manjit Singh v 
Paramjit Singh Bajaj [2008] SGHC 207, Tan Lee Meng J accepted the 
formulation adopted in the Singapore Court of Appeal in Caltong 
(Australia) Pty Ltd v Tong Tien See Construction Pte Ltd [2002] 
3 SLR 241 (Sukhpreet Kaur Bajaj d/o Manjit Singh v Paramjit Singh Bajaj 
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[2008] SGHC 207 at [31]), which had in turned followed Hoffmann LJ’s 
formulation in El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings Plc [1994] 2 All ER 685 
at 700, that it must be shown that the defendant had knowledge that the 
property received was traceable to a breach of trust: Sukhpreet Kaur 
Bajaj d/o Manjit Singh v Paramjit Singh Bajaj [2008] SGHC 207 at [47]. 
The focus of inquiry was on the state of knowledge of the defendant. 
A similar approach was taken in Sitt Tatt Bhd v Goh Tai Hock [2008] 
SGHC 220 by Judith Prakash J (at [34]–[45] and [57]); little was said of 
the legal test because it was clear that on the facts the defendant actually 
knew of the relevant facts. 
20.18 In Relfo Ltd v Bhimji Valji Jadva Varsani [2008] 4 SLR 657, 
Judith Prakash J considered the appropriate standard of liability for 
knowing receipt. The court emphasised that dishonesty was not an 
essential element in the cause of action, following the observation of 
Andrew Ang J in Firstlink Energy Ptd v Creanovate Pte Ltd [2007] 
1 SLR 1050 at [56] (noted in (2006) 7 SAL Ann Rev 397 at 398–400, 
paras 20.4–20.10). The court applied the test whether the defendant had 
some form of knowledge that the assets received were traceable to a 
breach of duty such that it was unconscionable for the defendant to 
retain them: Relfo Ltd v Bhimji Valji Jadva Varsani, at [48] and [51]. This 
was critical to the finding of liability (though the action ultimately failed 
because of the objection – unrelated to the present discussion – to the 
indirect enforcement of a foreign revenue law) in the case as it was 
conceded that there was no dishonesty, and the court held that there was 
in any event no evidence to base a finding of dishonesty: Relfo Ltd v 
Bhimji Valji Jadva Varsani, at [52]. 
20.19 In Centaurus Enterprises (S) Pte Ltd v Foong Yew Eong 
Christopher [2008] SGHC 195, Lai Siu Chiu J opined that liability to 
account as a constructive trustee for knowing receipt can be founded on 
an indifference to the possibility of fraud, and such indifference is 
tantamount to dishonesty so that for the purpose of the civil claim the 
defendant is treated as having actual knowledge: at [85] and [86]. Two 
points are worth noting. First, it is not clear whether the finding of 
dishonesty was treated as a necessary or sufficient condition for 
recipient liability. Secondly, it is not clear that it was subjective 
dishonesty that was found on the facts, given that the defendant is 
deemed to have had actual knowledge of the fraud. The substance of the 
decision on this point was the finding that the defendant had knowledge 
of such circumstances that made the indifference to the possibility of 
fraud reprehensible. 
20.20 In George Raymond Zage III v Rasif David [2008] SGHC 244, 
Woo Bih Li J, while accepting the test of knowledge in Caltong case 
(Caltong (Australia) Pty Ltd v Tong Tien See Construction Pte Ltd [2002] 
3 SLR 241), approved of the test of “unconscionable receipt” in Bank of 
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Credit and Commerce (International) Ltd v Akindele [2001] Ch 437 (CA), 
but at the same time equated it with the “want of probity” test 
enunciated in the case of Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Herbert Smith & Co (No 2) 
[1969] 2 Ch 276 at 300–301 by Edmund Davies LJ, which had been 
approved by the Court of Appeal case of Rajabali Jumabhoy v Ameerali 
R Jumabhoy [1998] 2 SLR 439 (CA) at [105]. In the last mentioned case, 
although the Court of Appeal found the defendant not to be wanting in 
probity, it was also held that the defendant did not have the knowledge, 
whether actual, constructive, or imputed, of the trust such as to render it 
unconscionable to retain the property: Rajabali Jumabhoy v Ameerali 
R Jumabhoy [1998] 2 SLR 439 at [108], [113], [118] and [119]. 
20.21 The adoption of the test of unconscionability for recipient 
liability in Bank of Credit and Commerce (International) Ltd v Akindele 
[2001] Ch 437 had come as something of a surprise when the Privy 
Council had earlier warned that “unconscionability” means different 
things in different contexts: Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Philip Tan 
Kok Ming [1995] 2 AC 378 (PC, Brunei) at 392). But the primary 
motivations in the Akindele case appear to be to distinguish the test for 
recipient liability from the test of dishonesty in accessory liability 
(dishonest assistance) on the one hand, and to prevent the over-
calibration of the concept of knowledge as a standard of liability for 
recipient liability on the other. 
20.22 While there remains considerable debate whether liability for 
receipt of trust property should be strict or fault-based (see (2006) 
7 SAL Ann Rev 397 at 399–400, para 20.9), modern authorities clearly 
distinguish between the two forms of liability for assistance and receipt, 
and while demanding dishonesty for the former, require something less 
for recipient liability: see, eg, Bank of Credit and Commerce 
(International) Ltd v Akindele [2001] Ch 437; Tang Hsiu Lan v Pua Ai 
Seok [2000] SGHC 163 at [12]; Twinsectra v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164 
at [105]; Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam [2002] 3 WLR 1913 at [87]; 
El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings Plc [1993] 3 All ER 717 at 738–740. 
However, it appears that the court in George Raymond Zage III v Rasif 
David [2008] SGHC 244 has equiparated the two standards, unless 
“probity” has been used in a diluted sense different from “honesty” as 
understood in the law on dishonest assistance. Either way, there is a risk 
of confusion being caused. On the facts, however, given their respective 
states of knowledge, one defendant was found to be dishonest (and 
hence liable for receipt of trust property as well as dishonest assistance 
of breach of trust) and others were found to be acting neither 
dishonestly nor unconscionably, so it is hard to say that any legal 
distinction made in the tests for liability had made any actual difference 
to the results on the facts. 
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Relief against forfeiture 
20.23 In Sembawang Capital Pte Ltd v Ng Hock Kon [2009] 1 SLR 833, 
the defendant entered into an agreement with the plaintiff, to which he 
owed some $4m, under which he mortgaged his house, and covenanted 
to make monthly instalment payments, to the plaintiff. The agreement 
provided for the termination of the agreement should the defendant fail 
to pay an instalment, and that upon such termination, the outstanding 
balance will become immediately payable and the plaintiff will be 
entitled to foreclose on the mortgage. After the defendant was three 
months in arrears, the plaintiff commenced proceedings to foreclose on 
the mortgage and to recover the balance of the debt. The defendant 
argued that the contract had not been validly terminated, and that even 
if it had, the court should provide relief against forfeiture. The court 
(Kan Ting Chiu J) found that the contract had been validly terminated. 
20.24 On the relief against forfeiture, the defendant was not seeking 
more time to pay the arrears or the instalments. Instead the relief he was 
seeking from the court was to remain in the house and to continue 
paying the monthly instalments in accordance with the contract. The 
court noted that this was not the usual case of relief against forfeiture. 
The jurisdiction was usually invoked to prevent the forfeiture of 
deposits and instalments made towards the payment of land, as well as 
the contractual right to buy land. However, the court was of the view 
that if the jurisdiction could be invoked in such cases, it should also be 
theoretically available in the present case, noting that the jurisdiction 
was not to be confined to any particular type of case. 
20.25 It is to be noted that the remedy that the defendant was seeking 
was effectively the continuation of the contract; in other words, the 
forfeiture in respect of the relief sought was of his contractual right to 
have the agreement performed. Although this was a commercial 
contract, it was closely connected with an interest in land. Thus, it did 
not fall on the wrong side of the court’s reluctance to extend the 
jurisdiction to commercial agreements unconnected with interests in land 
(Pacific Rim Investments Pte Ltd v Lam Seng Tiong [1995] 3 SLR 1 (CA) 
at 16). Indeed, there is a close analogy with the case of relief against 
forfeiture of the contractual right to buy land for late payment where 
the seller purports to terminate the contract. 
20.26 Noting the requirement for exceptional circumstances in order 
to exercise the power to grant relief against forfeiture (following Pacific 
Rim Investments Pte Ltd v Lam Seng Tiong [1995] 3 SLR 1), the court 
then examined the facts but found no unconscionable or unjust actions 
by the plaintiff in the circumstances. On the contrary, the court thought 
that the plaintiff had in fact been indulgent with the defendant’s 
breaches of contract. The court also noted the irrelevance of the fact 
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that the defendant was in poor health or that he had paid the arrears; 
such facts did not show any injustice or unconscionability: Sembawang 
Capital Pte Ltd v Ng Hock Kon [2009] 1 SLR 833 at [45]–[47]. 
20.27 On the other hand, in Teo Beng Ngoh v Quek Kheng Leong Nicky 
[2008] SGHC 228, the High Court (Lai Siu Chiu J) granted relief against 
forfeiture, albeit on terms, to a defaulting contracting party when there 
was a clear finding that there had been no unconscionability or injustice 
in the innocent party’s claim to terminate the contract for repudiatory 
breach. Contiguous plots of land belonging to the vendors had been 
amalgamated and subdivided for redevelopment, and one such 
redeveloped plot, comprising a semi-detached house, was the subject of 
the sale and purchase agreement in question. The purchasers, having 
exercised the option to purchase and having paid 5% of the total 
purchase price, had been let into possession by the vendors for the 
purpose of carrying out renovations. The purchasers refused to pay the 
balance of the purchase price on the basis that certain caveats existed on 
the parent lots of the property, while the vendors maintained the 
position that those caveats did not affect the subject property of the sale. 
By the time the purchasers tendered payment, the vendors had already 
purported to terminate the contract for repudiatory breach. In the 
proceedings, the vendors sought vacant possession as well as damages, 
while the purchasers sought specific performance and damages for 
breach of contract. The court held that the purchasers’ refusal amounted 
to a repudiatory breach, and that consequently the vendors had the legal 
right to terminate the contract. However, the court, while refusing the 
purchasers’ claim for specific performance as such, nevertheless 
exercised its jurisdiction to grant relief against forfeiture, and ordered 
that the parties should complete the contract and that the purchasers 
should pay the vendors’ outgoings (for the period between 
commencement of occupation and the date of repudiatory breach) and 
rental (from the date of repudiatory breach to the date for completion) 
from the property, but that if the purchasers refuse to accept the terms 
for the relief, the vendors would be at liberty to resell the property in the 
open market and claim damages from the purchasers for the difference 
between the sale price and market price the vendors would have 
obtained at the date of the breach. 
20.28 The primary point of interest in this case to the law of 
restitution is the expansion of the scope of the jurisdiction to grant relief 
against forfeiture, since this jurisdiction also performs a restitutionary 
function (see (2007) 8 SAL Ann Rev 364 at 366–376, paras 20.8–20.41). 
It is true that the court in its equitable jurisdiction has the discretionary 
power to grant relief on terms. However, it is doubtful that the power to 
impose terms on the relief granted (which invariably exists) can enable 
the court to bypass the threshold it has set for itself for the exercise of a 
particular equitable jurisdiction. Thus, in this case, in so far as the 
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suggestion is that even if no exceptional circumstances exist which 
reveal elements of unconscionability and injustice (a threshold 
requirement in Pacific Rim Investments Pte Ltd v Lam Seng Tiong [1995] 
3 SLR 1), relief against forfeiture may be granted as long as the terms 
imposed achieve justice in the case, it effectively emasculates the 
threshold jurisdictional requirement. The reasons for imposing the 
jurisdictional threshold are two-fold: as a matter of doctrine, equity 
needs a reason to act on the conscience of the innocent party to prevent 
him from asserting his strict legal rights; and as a matter of policy, there 
should be very strong reasons to take away the innocent party’s 
contractual rights. Relief on terms as such addresses neither of these 
concerns. 
Restitution after breach of contract 
20.29 It is trite law that the normal remedy for breach of contract is 
compensatory damages. The innocent party can normally elect between 
the expectation or reliance measure of damages, except that he will be 
left to the reliance measure if the expectation measure cannot be 
ascertained with reasonable certainty, and that he will be left to claim in 
the expectation measure if it is shown that he had entered into a bad 
bargain (ie, he could not expect to recoup his reliance expenses). It is 
also trite law that the innocent party may be able to claim in the 
restitutionary measure if he is able to terminate the contract and prove a 
restitutionary cause of action, usually total failure of consideration for 
money claims. Thus, it is clear that the innocent party has three 
potential measures of recovery after a breach of contract: expectation 
losses, reliance losses, and restitution for the gains transferred from the 
innocent party to the defaulting party. More recently, a fourth measure 
has emerged based on the gains (not necessary from the innocent party) 
obtained by the defendant by reason of the breach of contract. It is 
important to note, however, the different doctrinal bases underpinning 
the various measures of recovery. The conceptual difference between the 
contractual and restitutionary claims in the first three measures was 
apparently lost sight of in Lee Seng Cheong v Seah Bak Seng [2008] 
2 SLR 745, which made it a difficult case to explain on doctrinal 
grounds. 
20.30 The plaintiffs – who were a number of individuals – had 
contracted to purchase various amounts of shares in a Malaysian 
company from the defendant over a period of time. The company was in 
the process of preparing to be listed, and the plaintiffs had hoped to 
make profits from the listing. The plaintiffs alleged the various failures 
of the defendant to deliver the shares on time were breaches of contract 
which had caused them to fail to make profits on the stock exchange, 
and claimed for the return of the purchase price as well as loss of profits. 
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The plaintiffs also refused to accept the delivery of shares pursuant to 
some of the contracts on the basis of repudiatory breaches from delay. 
The defendant argued that he had not been in breach of contract. 
20.31 The court (Chan Seng Onn J) held that the defendant was in 
breach of an implied condition of timely delivery of the shares in failing 
to deliver the shares expeditiously. Thus, in respect of the shares that the 
plaintiffs had refused to take delivery, the plaintiffs were entitled to such 
refusal and to terminate the contracts for breach of condition and to sue 
for damages for breach. In respect of the shares where the plaintiffs had 
accepted delivery, the plaintiffs were still entitled to remedies for breach 
of contract. However, the court denied the plaintiffs’ claims for 
expectation damages on the ground that such losses could not be 
proven with reasonable certainty in the circumstances. Instead, the court 
decided to award the restitutionary measure, and ordered the defendant 
to refund the purchase price to the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs to return 
the shares to the defendant (and various ancillary orders to work out 
consequences). 
20.32 There are two difficulties with this approach. First, it is not clear 
that the contracts which had been fully executed on both sides 
(acceptance with knowledge of the late delivery on the one hand and the 
payment on the other) could be terminated for breach. There is an 
analogy in the sale of goods context (sale of shares do not fall within this 
context) where generally the acceptance of goods in breach of condition 
bars the right to terminate the contract: Sale of Goods Act (Cap 393, 
1999 Rev Ed, s 11(3) (see also Treitel: The Law of Contract (E Peel ed) 
(13th Ed, 2007) at para 18-082). Secondly, even if the contracts could be 
terminated, the plaintiffs still needed to establish total failure of 
consideration in the sense that they had not “received the benefit of any 
part of that which they had bargained for”: Stocznia Gdanska SA v 
Latvian Shipping Co [1998] 1 WLR 574 (HL) at 587. It seems a long shot 
to argue that the plaintiffs in this case got nothing of what they had 
bargained for because of the diminution in the value of the shares due 
to late delivery. 
20.33 It appears to be unusual that the court did not award the 
reliance measure of damages (giving credit for value received) upon 
concluding that the expectation measure could not be proven with 
reasonable certainty. Apparently, the plaintiff had asked for the return of 
the purchase price, and there did not appear to have been any objection 
on doctrinal grounds by opposing counsel. Indeed, the judge pointed 
out “at the outset that counsel cited no authorities to assist me on the 
general principles of law that were applicable to this case”: Lee Seng 
Cheong v Seah Bak Seng [2008] 2 SLR 745 at [26]. In theoretical and 
practical terms, the contracts were ordered to be unwound, which is a 
consequence normally attached to rescission of a contract as a result of a 
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vitiating factor rather than termination of a contract for breach. The 
distinction is critical because remedies for breach of contract are 
intended to compensate the innocent party for the loss of performance 
of the contract. 
20.34 The law of restitution provides a route to the result in the case 
but only if the contract is terminated for breach and total failure of 
consideration is established. The first requirement is to ensure minimal 
disturbance to the contractual allocation of risk, and the second 
requirement provides the legal reason for the reversal of an unjust 
enrichment by the defaulting party at the expense of the innocent party. 
This case is unusual in the way that the issues were presented to the 
court, and notwithstanding the judicial references to “restitutionary 
measure of damages” for breach of contract (Lee Seng Cheong v Seah 
Bak Seng [2008] 2 SLR 745 at [32] and [35]), it should not be taken as 
authority that a new restitutionary measure has been assimilated as an 
alternative remedy for breach of contract. 
Quantum meruit 
20.35 The High Court decision in Yaku Shin (JB) Sdn Bhd v Panasonic 
AVC Networks Singapore Pte Ltd [2008] 4 SLR 193 (Woo Bih Li J) 
highlights two issues relating to a quantum meruit claim. The first relates 
to the relationship between the restitutionary and the contractual 
quantum meruit claim, which has been explained by the local courts 
several times before (see especially Lee Siong Kee v Beng Tiong Trading, 
Import and Export [1988] Pte Ltd [2000] 4 SLR 559 (CA) at [29]–[39] 
and Rabiah Bee bte Mohamed Ibrahim v Salem Ibrahim [2007] 2 SLR 655 
at [124]) but which strangely continues to be a source of confusion. The 
second relates to the issue whether the defendant had been enriched at 
the plaintiff ’s expense at all. 
20.36 The plaintiff, after supplying the defendant with goods, was 
suing the defendant on the alternative bases of a contractual obligation 
to pay the price and a restitutionary obligation to pay for the value of 
the goods. The court dismissed the contractual claim on the basis that 
the supply of goods in the disputed transaction was made pursuant to 
purchase orders issued by the defendant to a company (since gone into 
receivership) related to the plaintiff. It was not necessary to decide 
whether the plaintiff had supplied the goods as agent for the related 
company. It was enough to decide that there was no contractual 
relationship between the parties. 
20.37 Technically, the alternative claim was one for quantum valebat, 
but the litigants and the court were content to discuss the issues under 
the rubric of quantum meruit, and it would be pedantic to quibble on 
this point as the same principles are applicable to both. The defendant 
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raised a number of objections to this claim which the court quickly 
dismissed as based on misconception of the restitutionary quantum 
meruit claim. The first objection was that the plaintiff had already 
elected to pursue a contractual cause of action. Quite apart from the fact 
that the claims were pleaded in the alternative, the court also pointed 
out that this was not a case calling for an election. The plaintiff would 
have to elect between suing for damages for breach of contract or 
terminating the contract for breach and then suing in quantum meruit 
for services received by the defaulting party, but this was not such a case: 
Yaku Shin (JB) Sdn Bhd v Panasonic AVC Networks Singapore Pte Ltd 
[2008] 4 SLR 193 at [77]–[78]. In other words, there were no 
inconsistent causes of action or remedies in this case. This was not a case 
of the same facts revealing two alternative causes of actions or remedies; 
here the contractual and restitutionary claims were mutually exclusive. 
20.38 The second related objection was based on the statement in 
Rabiah Bee bte Mohamed Ibrahim v Salem Ibrahim [2007] 2 SLR 655 
(discussed in (2007) 8 SAL Ann Rev 364 at 364–366, paras 20.3–20.7) 
that a restitutionary quantum meruit claim arises when an innocent 
party has supplied goods or rendered services under a contract which 
has not been substantially performed and which has been terminated by 
him for the breach. The court was also quick to dismiss this objection 
on the basis that this was only one instance of a restitutionary quantum 
meruit claim, and that there was otherwise no legal requirement for a 
prior contract before a restitutionary quantum meruit claim may be 
made: Yaku Shin (JB) Sdn Bhd v Panasonic AVC Networks Singapore Pte 
Ltd [2008] 4 SLR 193 at [80]–[81]. 
20.39 Nevertheless, the plaintiff ’s restitutionary quantum meruit claim 
was dismissed. The reason was that the defendant remained legally liable 
to the other company to which it had issued the purchase orders. The 
defendant was therefore not enriched; to say otherwise would expose the 
defendant to double liability. The court pointed out that in this type of 
case, the plaintiff should have recourse to the other company on whose 
behalf it was making the delivery (which was in receivership) whether 
on contract or some other basis: Yaku Shin (JB) Sdn Bhd v Panasonic 
AVC Networks Singapore Pte Ltd [2008] 4 SLR 193 at [82]. 
20.40 In a case where A confers a benefit on C in performing its 
contractual obligation to B, the law is rightly resistant to allowing A to 
claim directly against C, for it subverts the contractual risk allocation 
between A and B: see Yew Sang Hong Ltd v The Hong Kong Housing 
Authority [2008] 3 HKLRD 307 (CA, HK), the English cases discussed in 
P Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2nd Ed, 2005) at pp 89–93, and the judge’s 
reference with approval to the plaintiff ’s own submission on this very 
point against the defendant’s counterclaim (Yaku Shin (JB) Sdn Bhd v 
Panasonic AVC Networks Singapore Pte Ltd [2008] 4 SLR 193 at [83]). 
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20.41 However, the position is less certain where A never had a valid 
contractual relationship with B. Some authors oppose such recovery 
(eg, A Burrows, The Law of Restitution (2nd Ed, 2002) at pp 31–41; 
A Tettenborn, “Lawful Receipt – A Justifying Factor” [1997] RLR 1 at 1) 
while others rely on subrogation cases to argue for a wider principle of 
restitutionary recovery (eg, P Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2nd Ed, 2005) 
at pp 93–98; C Mitchell, “Unjust Enrichment” in English Private Law 
(A Burrows ed) (2nd Ed, 2007) at paras 18.35–18.38). The subrogation 
technique (A being subrogated to B’s claim against C) if applicable can 
overcome the problem of C’s double liability to A and B, and address 
concerns about C’s potential defences and set-offs against B. To the 
extent that this “leapfrogging” argument presents a viable restitutionary 
cause of action against C, it requires A to establish a restitutionary claim 
against B in the first place, and there was nothing to suggest that 
anything like this had been pleaded in the instant case. 
20.42 In any event, it is clear that a quantum meruit claim (whether 
contractual or restitutionary) cannot succeed if services were intended 
to be given gratuitously. In Ng Giap Hon v Westcomb Securities Pte Ltd 
[2008] SGHC 101, the plaintiff ’s claim against the defendant for 
damages for breach of contract, in respect of failure to pay a 
commission for services rendered, was dismissed on the basis that there 
was no breach of contract. An alternative claim for quantum meruit was 
also dismissed. Choo Han Teck J emphasised that the quantum meruit 
claim cannot be used as a back-up claim in the event that the court does 
not find a breach of contract, and that a person is not entitled to be paid 
for work freely given unless the circumstances show that payment was 
envisaged even if the amount had not been made clear: Ng Giap Hon v 
Westcomb Securities Pte Ltd, at [6]. It is not clear whether the claim was 
based on the contractual or restitutionary quantum meruit, as the judge 
pointed out in his brief treatment of the argument that he did not want 
to say more about the claim other than what had been said about it in 
the course of the entire proceedings. 
Tracing 
20.43 In Neo Kok Eng v Yeow Chern Lean [2008] SGHC 151 (Lai Siu 
Chiu J), the court allowed the plaintiff to trace funds misappropriated 
by one former employee of a company controlled by the plaintiff to 
another former employee (the defendant) of another company also 
controlled by the plaintiff, into immovable property purchased with the 
funds. The court accepted that there was no fiduciary relationship 
between the plaintiff and the defendant. However, it is not clear how the 
equity to trace arose on the facts since there was no prior breach of 
trust. There was a separate claim by the defrauded company against the 
first mentioned employee for breach of fiduciary duty, but there was 
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nothing in the present case to suggest that the court was relying on a 
prior breach of fiduciary duty owed by this employee to the plaintiff. 
The court may have implicitly relied on the observation of Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington 
London Borough Council [1996] AC 669 at 715–716 that although a thief 
taking common law property does not divest the owner of legal title, the 
thief may nevertheless be regarded as a constructive trustee to enable the 
owner to invoke the rules of tracing in equity. 
Compound interest 
20.44 The question of a restitutionary award of compound interest 
was briefly touched upon in The Oriental Insurance Co Ltd v Reliance 
National Asia Re Pte Ltd [2008] SGHC 236 (Chan Seng Onn J). The case 
concerned an application to set aside an expert determination of an 
expert adjudicator appointed pursuant to a compromise agreement. 
Although the award of interest by the adjudicator was not challenged on 
the basis that it was made on a compound rate, the court thought that it 
was entirely appropriate for the adjudicator to do so. The court further 
observed that under Singapore law, any award of compound interest as 
damages or restitutionary relief was not precluded by s 12 of the Civil 
Law Act (Cap 43, 1999 Rev Ed), which only prohibited compound 
interest awarded on damages: at [130]. By implication, such damages or 
claims would also fall outside s 18(2) and Sched 1, para 6 of the 
Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 1999 Rev Ed), conferring 
power to award interest to be paid on debt or damages. Significantly, the 
court endorsed the reasoning of the majority in the House of Lords in 
Sempra Metals Ltd v Her Majesty’s Commissioners of Inland Revenue and 
Customs [2008] 1 AC 561 that there is a common law right to claim 
compound interest as an independent claim to restitutionary relief or as 
a head of damage in contract or tort. The court did not, however, have 
the occasion to discuss whether in a restitutionary claim for compound 
interest, the enrichment of the defendant is measured by the notional 
market rate or the actual gains made. 
Defences 
Assumption of risk and mistaken payments 
20.45 This issue was considered briefly as a defence in Mok Kwong Yue 
v Ding Leng Kong [2008] SGHC 65 (discussed above, at para 20.12). The 
court noted that the principle underlying the defence that recovery will 
be denied if the mistaken payer had assumed the risk of the mistake was 
akin to the requirement of an operative mistake grounding recovery: 
Mok Kwong Yue v Ding Leng Kong, at [46]. On the facts, for the same 
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reasons that the court earlier found no operative mistake because the 
plaintiff had not been motivated by an assumption of his personal 
liability in making the payments, the court found that the plaintiff had 
assumed the risk of payment. Thus, the defence had been made out. 
Limitation periods 
20.46 In Neo Kok Eng v Yeow Chern Lean [2008] SGHC 151 (Lai Siu 
Chiu J), the court applied Management Corp Strata Title No 473 v 
De Beers Jewellery Pte Ltd [2001] 4 SLR 90 (HC) to hold that a claim for 
money had and received in respect of the defendant’s receipt of the 
plaintiff ’s funds was not a claim in contract or tort and therefore not 
caught under s 6(1)(a) of the Limitation Act (Cap 163, 1996 Rev Ed): 
Neo Kok Eng v Yeow Chern Lean, at [129]. Laches was not considered. 
20.47 There was a concurrent claim in conversion in respect of the 
restitution claim in question: see Neo Kok Eng v Yeow Chern Lean [2008] 
SGHC 151 at [115] and [129]. It was not clear whether the money had 
and received claim pleaded was based on the unjust enrichment of the 
defendant by way of subtraction from the plaintiff or by way of waiver 
of tort (see United Australia Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1941] AC 1) 
though the discussion of the claim suggests that at least the court had 
the former conceptualisation of the claim in view. If the money had and 
received claim is founded on the waiver of the tort, it is arguable that the 
limitation period should be that applicable to the tort since the remedy 
depends on the proof of the commission of the tort (G Virgo, The 
Principles of the Law of Restitution (2nd Ed, 2006) at pp 752–753), but in 
Chesworth v Farrer [1967] 1 QB 407, the alternative claim in money had 
and received was treated as analogous to contract and subject to the 
contractual limitation period. Chesworth v Farrer is not consistent with 
Singapore authorities in so far as it decides that action for money had 
and received is subject to the statutory limitation period for contractual 
debt claims. Its relevance in this context is the denial of the use of the 
tort limitation period, and under Singapore law, this will leave the claim 
in the same statutory vacuum as common law restitutionary claims not 
arising from waiver of tort. 
20.48 In the same case, a concurrent claim for a declaration of 
constructive trust in respect of the traceable proceeds of the plaintiff ’s 
property was also held to be immune from statutory time bar, 
confirming that s 22(1)(b) of the Limitation Act (Cap 163, 
1996 Rev Ed), which disapplies the statutory time bar, applies to 
constructive trustees in possession of property: Neo Kok Eng v Yeow 
Chern Lean [2008] SGHC 151 at [133]. 
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Choice of law 
20.49 In the previous volume of this review, it was pointed out 
((2007) 8 SAL Ann Rev 364 at 388, paras 20.80–20.81) that there was a 
latent conflict between two Court of Appeal decisions, one holding that 
the law governing a beneficiary’s equitable claim based on the breach of 
fiduciary duties is governed by the law of the underlying relationship 
between the fiduciary and the beneficiary (Rickshaw Investments Ltd v 
Nicolai Baron von Uexkull [2007] 1 SLR 377 (CA)), and the other 
holding that the beneficiary’s claim for restitution against a fiduciary 
(apparently the court did not distinguish between the claim against the 
fiduciary and the third party receiving funds from the fiduciary) is 
governed by the law of the place of enrichment (Kartika Ratna Thahir v 
PT Pertambangan Minyak dan Gas Bumi Negara (Pertamina) [1994] 
3 SLR 257 (CA)). 
20.50 In so far as the Court of Appeal in the latter case had dismissed 
the argument that the law of the underlying contractual relationship 
governed a principal’s claim against an agent for bribes received in 
breach of fiduciary duty on the simple basis that the relationship was 
not a “contractual” one falling within r 230(2)(a) in Dicey, Morris and 
Collins: The Conflict of Laws (14th Ed, 2006) (r 201(2)(a) in Dicey and 
Morris: The Conflict of Laws (12th Ed, 1993) as considered in Kartika 
Ratna Thahir v PT Pertambangan Minyak dan Gas Bumi Negara 
(Pertamina) [1994] 3 SLR 257), this view must now be qualified by the 
observation of the Court of Appeal in CIMB Bank Bhd v Dresdner 
Kleinwort Ltd [2008] 4 SLR 543 (Chao Hick Tin and Andrew 
Phang JJA), where the court observed that the underlying rationale 
behind the rule was a search for the most closely connected law (CIMB 
Bank Bhd v Dresdner Kleinwort Ltd, at [31]) and that sometimes a non-
contractual pre-existing relationship between the parties may justify the 
application of that law to the restitutionary claim: CIMB Bank Bhd v 
Dresdner Kleinwort Ltd, at [59]. 
20.51 Notwithstanding this development, an example of the latent 
conflict referred to above can be seen in Focus Energy Ltd v Aye Aye Soe 
[2008] SGHC 206 (Judith Prakash J). The issue arose in the context of 
an application to stay proceedings in Singapore by a company against its 
director claiming under the tort of conspiracy and an equitable claim 
for alleged breach of fiduciary duty. The latter claim was for an account 
for gains made from receiving bribes and for misdirecting funds 
belonging to the company (at least as the remedy is known under 
Singapore domestic law). The court held that the claim for account, 
being an equitable claim, was governed by the law of the place of 
incorporation (British Virgin Islands), it being the law of the underlying 
legal relationship between the parties (following Base Metal Trading Ltd 
v Shamurin [2004] EWCA Civ 1316, [2005] 1 WLR 1157 (CA)). In 
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addition, however, the court considered that, based on an alternative 
analysis of unjust enrichment, the claim would have been governed by 
the law of the place of enrichment (Singapore). The court held that the 
defendant’s receipt, retention and use of the money and wrongful 
conduct in refusing to account for her gains took place in Singapore 
made Singapore the most closely connected country to the claim, and 
this was not outweighed by the parties’ prior legal relationship: Focus 
Energy Ltd v Aye Aye Soe [2008] SGHC 206 at [37]. 
20.52 Under the current state of the common law authorities, the 
reasoning of the court cannot be faulted. However, the consequence was 
that the governing law of what was for all practical purposes a single 
claim depended on how the claim was argued. Looking at it as a breach 
of director’s fiduciary duty claim, as the court did in its main analysis, 
leads to the characterisation as a corporate law issue resulting in the 
application of the law of the place of incorporation, but looking at it as 
a claim to reverse unjust enrichment as the court did in its alternative 
analysis results in characterisation as restitution and the application of 
the law of the place of enrichment. One might also add that looking at it 
as an equitable wrong (which the court came very close to doing so) 
could lead to characterisation as a tort (see OJSC Oil Co Yugraneft v 
Abramovich [2008] EWHC 2613 (Comm)) and the application of the 
law of the place of the wrong (which was also the law of the forum in 
this case so double actionability was satisfied, but potentially subject to 
an exception of a more closely connected foreign law: Rickshaw 
Investments Ltd v Nicolai Baron von Uexkull [2007] 1 SLR 377 (CA). It is 
a sad reflection on the state of the common law that the “most closely 
connected” law to a claim depends on the label(s) under which the 
plaintiff chooses to plead and argue it. It is this type of consequences 
that led to the American choice of law revolution rejecting 
characterisation altogether and moving towards open-ended searches 
for governmental interests. This is not the only solution. The European 
Union has or will find the solution in legislatively straitjacketing the 
claim (for example, a claim that falls within the Rome I Regulation on 
the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations will by that reason fall 
outside the Rome II Regulation on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual 
Obligations). As for the common law, judicial techniques will need to be 
developed – or further developed (discussed elsewhere: see T M Yeo, 
Choice of Law for Equitable Doctrines (2004) at paras 3.29–3.44; 
A Dickinson, “Applicable Law Arbitrage: An Opportunity Lost” (2005) 
121 LQR 374) – and these include the judicious use of connecting 
factors, or borrowing the civilian technique of adopting one 
characterisation to the exclusion of others. 
20.53 CIMB Bank Bhd v Dresdner Kleinwort Ltd [2008] 4 SLR 543, 
discussed above at para 20.50, marks another significant contribution by 
the Singapore Court of Appeal to the presently uncertain state of the 
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choice of law rules in common law countries for restitutionary claims. It 
discussed the extent to which the court should have recourse to the 
proper law of the underlying contractual relationship in a restitutionary 
claim arising out of a void contract (on this problem, see generally, 
J Harris, “Does Choice of Law Make Any Sense?” (2004) 57 CLP 305 and 
A Chong, “Choice of Law for Void Contracts and their Restitutionary 
Aftermath: The Putative Governing Law of the Contract” in 
Re-Examining Contract and Unjust Enrichment (P Giliker ed) (2007) 
ch 9) in a dispute arising in a forum non conveniens context. After a 
careful consideration of the judicial and academic authorities, it held 
that a nuanced approach should be taken depending on the nature of 
the challenge to the contractual relationship and whether it directly 
affects the parties’ decision and reasonable expectations of the law 
governing their legal relationship. Thus, in the instant case, it was held 
that where both parties had taken the common position that neither 
had agreed to enter into the contract in the first place because they had 
both been defrauded by a third party, it would be unfair to hold either 
party bound by any choice of law clause in the contract in respect of any 
consequential restitutionary claims. 
